
FREE COMPANION GUIDE · TRADECRAFT

The 9 Cases That Explain Espionage

Court records and declassified files. The record, not the legend.



Rob Baard

AUTHOR OF FIELDCRAFT · ESCAPE & EVASION

THE DOCTRINE

Method, Not Myth. The Record Decides.

Espionage is remembered by its endings: the arrest, the trial, the defector at the airport. Those are where the cameras arrive. But they are the last link of a long chain, and not where the real work is done. The work is in the method. How a stranger becomes a source. How two people who must never be seen together exchange a package. How a false name survives a border guard's second look.

That body of method is tradecraft. It is built to leave no record, so much of what is confidently "known" turns out to rest on one uncorroborated account, copied from book to book until it hardened into fact.

> *The films gave you the version you wanted. This is the other one.*

The Case Spine

Nine documented cases run through the book, each tied to the method it shows best. This guide gives you each one, with what the record proves kept apart from what is only claimed. The full book takes them through 37 chapters.

1. **The Cambridge Five** — ideology.
2. **Oleg Penkovsky** — the walk-in.
3. **Greville Wynne** — the courier.
4. **George Blake** — the tunnel betrayed.
5. **Aldrich Ames** — the money trail.
6. **Robert Hanssen** — the dead drop.
7. **The 2010 Illegals** — deep cover.
8. **Farewell** — technology theft exposed.
9. **Oleg Gordievsky** — the escape.

CASE 1 OF 9 · CHAPTERS 5 AND 29

The Cambridge Five.

Ideology: recruit early, then wait for the access.

Kim Philby, Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess, Anthony Blunt and their circle were recruited by Soviet intelligence as young men at Cambridge in the 1930s, out of genuine conviction. They were not paid into it. They rose into the Foreign Office, the Security Service and SIS itself, and passed what they saw to Moscow for the better part of two decades.

What the record shows

— Maclean passed diplomatic and atomic secrets, including from the Washington embassy. Philby rose to head the SIS section set to counter Soviet subversion.

— A believer needs neither payment nor threat, and will run the risk for years because they think they are on the right side of history.

— It came apart slowly. Maclean and Burgess fled in 1951, Philby defected in 1963, and Blunt confessed in 1964 but was named only in 1979.

— The second cost, after the secrets: lasting damage to trust between British and American intelligence.

ON THE RECORD — *The exact timing of each recruitment, and the identity of any 'fifth man', are still debated.*

> *An investment made in a university common room that paid out in the corridors of government a generation later.*

CASE 2 OF 9 · CHAPTERS 7, 24 AND 36

Oleg Penkovsky.

The volunteer who would not be refused.

A colonel in Soviet military intelligence, Penkovsky tried again and again in 1960 to reach the West, once asking American students on a Moscow bridge to carry a package to their embassy. A service faced with an unsolicited Soviet colonel had every reason to suspect a trap. He was finally taken on in 1961 and run jointly by the British and Americans.

What the record shows

— Over roughly eighteen months he passed thousands of frames of photographed documents: missile manuals, military doctrine, technical data.

— When the Soviet missile sites in Cuba were photographed in 1962, his manuals helped analysts identify the systems.

— He was believed because his material could be checked, and because it genuinely cost the Soviet side. A plant rarely gives away anything that truly wounds.

— Arrested in October 1962, tried publicly in Moscow in 1963, and executed.

ON THE RECORD — *The popular claim that he single-handedly saved the world in the missile crisis is an exaggeration.*

> *The richest offers and the most dangerous traps arrive looking exactly alike.*

CASE 3 OF 9 · CHAPTERS 12, 16 AND 34

Greville Wynne.

The courier, and the cost of a middle man.

Penkovsky sat inside Moscow, where his handlers could not meet him. Greville Wynne, a British businessman with real trade in the Eastern Bloc, had a genuine reason to travel there and meet Soviet officials. He stood in the gap, so the colonel and the West were never directly linked on Soviet soil.

What the record shows

— His cover did what a courier's cover should: it made the contact look like the ordinary business of trade.

— When Penkovsky travelled legally to London and Paris, joint teams debriefed him for hours, contact no Moscow meeting could have safely allowed.

— A middle man insulates both ends. He is also a single human link who, once caught, points in both directions.

— Wynne was seized in Budapest in November 1962, tried alongside Penkovsky, and later exchanged for a Soviet illegal.

ON THE RECORD — *Wynne's own memoir is embellished. The book treats its colourful details as recollection, not fact.*

> *Every person added for safety is also a person who can betray, be broken, or be caught.*

CASE 4 OF 9 · CHAPTERS 23, 32 AND 33

George Blake.

The Berlin Tunnel, betrayed before it began.

In the mid-1950s the American and British services dug a tunnel from West Berlin into the Soviet sector to tap the cables carrying Soviet and East German military and intelligence traffic. The CIA called it Operation GOLD. George Blake, an SIS officer and a Soviet agent, had served as secretary at the 1953 planning conference in London. The KGB knew before the first earth was moved.

What the record shows

— The tap ran for the better part of a year, 1955 into 1956, filling tape after tape.

— The KGB let it run to protect their man rather than their cables, then staged its 'discovery' in 1956 as a chance find during repairs.

— Much of the take was probably genuine. Feeding false traffic on that scale would have meant telling too many people, and every one of them was a risk to Blake.

— Blake stayed in place, undetected, until an unrelated lead exposed him years later.

ON THE RECORD — *Accounts differ slightly on the timing of Blake's warnings and the Soviet decisions. The core is not in dispute.*

> *Compromised from the first day by a human traitor, and the enemy chose to let it run.*

CASE 5 OF 9 · CHAPTERS 5, 25 AND 30

Aldrich Ames.

Money, and the trail it leaves.

In April 1985 Ames, a CIA officer in Soviet operations, made contact with the Soviet embassy in Washington and offered information for money. The first payment was around fifty thousand dollars. The US Senate committee later found the total paid and set aside for him ran into the millions. The sources he named inside the Soviet system were rolled up, and a number of them were executed.

What the record shows

— He paid cash for a house costing over half a million dollars, drove a Jaguar, and spent far beyond his government salary.

— The CIA and FBI had information about his unexplained wealth. The failure to act on it sooner became a central criticism of the case.

— When the financial inquiry was finally pressed, the money ran him to ground. He was arrested in 1994 and pleaded guilty.

— The motive that makes a paid spy reliable produces the behaviour that betrays them.

ON THE RECORD — *It is widely believed, but not conclusively proven, that Ames first betrayed Oleg Gordievsky.*

> *Of all the trails a spy leaves, the financial one is the least forgiving.*

CASE 6 OF 9 · CHAPTERS 15 AND 30

Robert Hanssen.

Two decades without a single meeting.

An FBI counter-intelligence agent, Hanssen spied for Soviet and then Russian intelligence, on and off, from 1979 until 2001. According to the FBI's own affidavit, he never met his handlers face to face. The dead drop was not one of his methods. It was the spine of the whole operation.

What the record shows

— The affidavit records sites in Washington-area parks, a strip of white tape on a park sign as a signal, and packages left under a footbridge.

— With no meeting, there was no rendezvous to watch, no face to photograph, no moment of contact to catch.

— The weakness is the pattern, not the moment. A site is fixed, a signal can be read, and a routine becomes a rhythm a patient opponent learns.

— He was arrested in February 2001 at a park in Virginia, in the act of servicing a drop.

ON THE RECORD — *His fall came from a counter-intelligence investigation, not a failure of the dead drop itself.*

> *The dead drop removes the danger of the meeting, but it does not remove the danger of habit.*

CASE 7 OF 9 · CHAPTERS 10, 17 AND 19

The 2010 Illegals.

Deep cover, and the question of what it bought.

In June 2010 the FBI's Operation GHOST STORIES ended with ten arrests. They had been living across American suburbs as apparently ordinary couples and professionals, some for many years. In fact they were deep-cover officers of Russia's foreign intelligence service, the SVR.

What the record shows

— Some lived under the names of real people, including dead Canadians. Some couples had been paired by the service.

— Their links to Moscow ranged from short-wave radio to text hidden inside images posted online, and buried packages of cash.

— Within weeks they pleaded guilty and were exchanged at Vienna airport for four people held in Russia.

— The pedigree runs back to Rudolf Abel, arrested in New York in 1957 and swapped for U-2 pilot Gary Powers in 1962.

ON THE RECORD — *For all the years of cover, the intelligence the network actually delivered appears limited, and its value is debated.*

> *An illegal who becomes a public figure has already ceased to be useful as one.*

CASE 8 OF 9 · CHAPTERS 33 AND 37

Farewell.

One insider, and the map of a whole programme.

Vladimir Vetrov was an officer of Line X, the KGB directorate for scientific and technical intelligence. Disillusioned, he passed some four thousand documents to French intelligence in 1981 and 1982. They laid bare the Soviet effort to steal Western technology: the officers, the priorities, the shopping lists.

What the record shows

— The value was completeness. One source handed the West a map of the entire technical-collection enterprise.

— The West expelled Soviet officers and rolled up the networks the documents exposed.

— By the account of Gus Weiss of the National Security Council, the West also fed flawed technology back into the Soviet channels.

— The incentive behind economic espionage is permanent: for some states it will always be cheaper to steal capability than to create it.

ON THE RECORD — *The famous claim that sabotaged software blew up a Siberian pipeline in 1982 rests on a single memoir and has not been corroborated.*

> *A case study in how a good story outruns its evidence.*

CASE 9 OF 9 · CHAPTERS 14 AND 36

Oleg Gordievsky.

Operation PIMLICO: the way out, built in advance.

A senior KGB officer who worked secretly for SIS from the 1970s, Gordievsky rose to head the KGB station in London. In 1985 he was suddenly recalled to Moscow, interrogated under drugs, and left under suspicion. He signalled for the escape plan, slipped his watchers, and was smuggled across the border into Finland by British officers.

What the record shows

— He could tell the West not just what the KGB was doing but how it thought, including genuine Soviet alarm about a surprise Western nuclear attack.

— PIMLICO worked because it existed before it was needed. The signals, the trigger and the route had been agreed years earlier.

— Under watch in Moscow he could not have built an escape. Every step would have been the evidence that damned him.

— It entered history as a rare successful lift of a high-value source from the heart of a denied area.

ON THE RECORD — *The vivid details of the crossing come from his memoir and later reconstructions, and vary in the telling.*

> *The only escape available to him was one that already existed.*

HOW THE BOOK WEIGHS EVIDENCE

Three Tiers of Truth.

Proven, claimed, and simply not known.

Every claim in Tradecraft rests on graded evidence, and the grading is stated as it goes. Where the record is silent, disputed or thin, the text says so plainly rather than filling the gap with a good story.

1. **The documented record** — court judgments, official inquiries and declassified government files. The firmest ground, stated plainly.
2. **Reputable scholarship and corroborated memoir** — attributed and weighed, not simply repeated.
3. **Unverified memoir and interview** — used only when labelled as recollection or allegation, and never as the sole basis for a fact.

You will meet it in almost every case in this guide: a famous, dramatic claim set beside the more modest thing the evidence will actually bear.

> *Hold, always, to the difference between what happened, what is claimed to have happened, and what we simply do not know.*

A study of the historical record, not a field manual. The guide, like the book, explains how methods were used and why they held or failed. It contains nothing that would teach anyone to carry out an operation.

THE COMPLETE BOOK

Tradecraft.

This guide gave you the nine cases. The full book follows the lifecycle of an operation across 37 chapters and eleven parts: the services and the intelligence cycle, why people betray, cover and false identity, surveillance and the personal meeting, dead drops and cut-outs, secret writing and radio, the bug and the tapped cable, paying agents, the counter-intelligence mind, how operations fail, and what espionage actually achieves.

Every method chapter runs the same four steps: the method, the case, the outcome, and what it reveals. Every chapter ends with its sources.

> *The films gave you the version you wanted. This is the other one.*

ABOUT THE AUTHOR



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Rob Baard is a Bujinkan Ninjutsu Shihan and licensed Private Investigator with over thirty years of training. He studied directly under Grandmaster Masaaki Hatsumi in Japan. His documentary on the tradition was screened by invitation at the Togakushi Ninja Mountain ceremony and is now permanently exhibited at the Togakushi Ninja Museum, Japan.

Tradecraft turns his eye for cover, observation and evidence on the documented record of espionage itself, alongside Fieldcraft and Stealth & Camouflage.

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The Rob Baard Library.

Tradecraft is the whole of a subject his earlier books took in pieces. Stealth & Camouflage and Escape & Evasion cover concealment and escape. Fieldcraft is the working craft of the investigator. Micro Expressions, Body Language and Vocal Tells read people. Tradecraft is how it has all been done, on the record.

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